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Modernity comes in as many versions as there are thinkers or journalists, yet
all its deªnitions point, in one way or another, to the passage of time. The
adjective “modern” designates a new regime, an acceleration, a rupture, a
revolution in time. When the word “modern,” “modernization,” or “moder-
nity” appears, we are deªning, by contrast, an archaic and stable past. Fur-
thermore, the word is always being thrown into the middle of a ªght, in a
quarrel where there are winners and losers, Ancients and Moderns.1
So claimed the French philosopher Bruno Latour in his thesis on how, when,
and with what effect the idea of the Modern came about as a geographically dis-
tinct group of peoples and a set of individual characteristics, qualities and
knowledge. This article opens with Latour’s words as they succinctly encapsulate
the ideas that are brought below into conversation with deliberative democratic
theory and practice: a body of work that has in part laid the foundations for the
recent “deliberative turn” within environmental politics. This article takes up
Latour’s above claims and concerns about who the Modern deliberating subject
is, asking why s/he stands as so central to this deliberative turn and what hap-
pens if others join in, such as Latour’s Ancients?
Such questions are more pressing than their seemingly abstruse nature
suggests. They are in fact central to recent calls for empirical deliberative re-
search to pay attention to seemingly “nonmodern” places, to broaden delibera-
tive democracy’s geographical ambit, and thus enroll its methodologies to ad-
dress pressing environmental concerns around the world. Take, for example, the
article by Manjusha Gupte and Robert V. Bartlett that appeared in this journal in
2007, which argued that the existence of deliberative institutions in rural India
presents “signiªcant challenges” to extant deliberative democratic theories. En-
titled “Necessary Preconditions for Deliberative Environmental Democracy?
Challenging the Modernity Bias of Current Theory,” the authors argue against
the accepted wisdom that “democratic deliberation is suited only to conditions
1. Latour 1993, 10.
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of advanced modernity.”2 Empirical evidence of a functional village-level form
of deliberative democracy in what they call “nonmodern” rural India enables
Gupte and Bartlett’s claim that conditions other than those of advanced moder-
nity do allow for thriving deliberative democracy.
While sympathetic to their aims, this article argues that Gupte and Bart-
lett’s claim—that deliberative democratic research is biased towards the West—
understates the signiªcance of the issues they touch upon. This article argues
that rather than just being a case of bias, the concepts of modernity and the
nonmodern are problematic and imprecise. For this reason, they are weak con-
ceptual foundations for deliberative environmental democracy to continue to
rest uncritically upon, as Gupte and Bartlett’s analysis does. On one hand, the
term modernity is often deployed as shorthand for “wealthy liberal democra-
cies.”3 Similarly “nonmodern” suggests social, economic and political condi-
tions like those of the rural India of Gupte’s and Barttlet’s case study. Thus, as
adjectives they can, to some degree, describe prevailing institutional and socio-
political conditions.
On the other hand, the terms modern and nonmodern are nouns: accord-
ing to Latour’s quote above, proper nouns—i.e. the Modern and the Ancient.
And as such, these nouns are used to encapsulate particular superior qualities
and capacities of a certain group of people, like Latour’s Moderns. These Mod-
erns stand in distinction to those supposedly lacking such capacities, i.e.
Latour’s Ancients, who are deemed to be thoroughly steeped in tradition, pri-
mordial cultural practices, and bounded local knowledge. As such, this article
argues that the assumptions and centrality of this binary of Ancients and Mod-
erns (them/us, rational/irrational) in deliberative theory requires thorough and
critical interrogation, which necessitates more than the redressing of a bias by
adding nonmodern case studies to this body of work (as interesting and illumi-
nating as these case studies are).
Such interrogation is undertaken in this article. It begins with conceptual
discussions of the Modern and the Nonmodern in the next section. This is fol-
lowed by an illustrative example of qualitative data from deliberative work-
shops into forest management options in northern New Mexico, USA. This is a
place positioned within the supposed geographical hub of modernity, the
United States. Yet, it is also one where deliberators’ histories, emotions, tradi-
tions, and ethnicities become the mainstay of reasoned and open deliberation,
which is not characteristic of the Modern according to deliberative theory. As
such, this article makes the claim that the task of an unbiased deliberative envi-
ronmental democracy is not to cast Nonmoderns in the same light as Moderns;
i.e., that they too can be reasoned and rational.4 As the northern New Mexico
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example illustrates, the task is to show how deliberation amongst so-called
moderns trades as much in cultural practices and local knowledge as the
Nonmodern. Or, in the words of Bruno Latour, we (the Moderns) have never ac-
tually been modern. The implications of this argument for deliberative environ-
mental democracy thus supports broadening its empirical ambit, and a recon-
sideration of what is deemed “authentic” deliberation, and questions who are
regarded as “authentic” deliberators, opening up sites and modes of delibera-
tion beyond the currently limited purview of deliberative democratic theory.
The Pre-Conditions for Deliberative Democracy and the Realization
of “the Dream of Enlightenment”
Before the empirical discussion of northern New Mexico, it is vital to examine
who and what allegedly constitutes the Modern and modernity—and its alleged
opposite—within existing deliberative democratic debates. Here, the prerequi-
sites deemed indispensible for functioning deliberative democratic institutions
are key.
Within the theoretical literature, particular societal conditions are consid-
ered fundamental prerequisites for effective democratic deliberation. Although
debates about their speciªc contours continue, such prerequisites represent
measures of cultural, economic, and political equality, without which the free
and fair deliberation central to democratic theory is unattainable. However, as
deliberative practices now emerge from, and seek to address, a “burgeoning va-
riety of perspectives, problems and possibilities”5—nowhere more so than in
the ªeld of environmental decision-making6—the possibility and the necessity
of meeting said prerequisites has become open to fresh debate. In short, ques-
tions remains as to whether such preconditions really are indispensible to dem-
ocratic deliberation.
While such prerequisites remains a contentious intellectual sparring
ground, Gupte and Bartlett draw out ones that appears repeatedly within the lit-
erature, which they summarize as “socioeconomic and political equality; (2) ed-
ucation or literacy; (3) cultural homogeneity; (4) a level of overall societal
wealth above an unspeciªed threshold; (5) the social and cultural norms of mo-
dernity; and (6) institutional fragmentation and pluralism.”7 Such precondi-
tions are of course ideals. There are few, if any, nations or regions that have, do,
or will meet these conditions in full. What, then, do they signal and why are
they so important? In response to this question, it is necessary to consider delib-
erative democracy’s recent historical and intellectual genesis—but brieºy, as this
has been written about at considerable length elsewhere.8
The recent revival of interest in deliberative democratic theory arose
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amongst North American and European intellectuals from concern about the
unrepresentative nature of modern liberal democracies and the implications of
this status quo for addressing pressing environmental challenges.9 Inevitably,
such a project drew foremost on the intellectual genealogies of its proponents:
that is, European philosophical traditions of the past few centuries. As a result,
Baber and Bartlett contend, “it is evident that deliberative democracy is (at least
in part) an effort to realize more fully the dreams of the Enlightenment.”10
What such “dreams” entail remains contentious. However, they are often
typiªed as “an intellectual coming of age”11 where the Medieval shroud of non-
modern feudalism, superstition and religion is supplanted by reason and sys-
tematic inquiry, which together bring new freedoms of thought and new spaces
of association and interaction. As such, today’s deliberative turn has a direct—if
somewhat circuitous—lineage to such ideals, echoed in claims that “new delib-
erative spaces seek to replicate social relations in scientiªc and literary public
spheres of the late 17th and early 18th centuries in England and France.”12
These public spheres are upheld as spaces where the distorting effects of self-
interest and personal beliefs are replaced by “authentic deliberation.” Authen-
ticity here is attained through arguments framed by “natural reason” and ratio-
nality,13 which together are believed to make claims comprehensible to all—an
outcome that would not occur if arguments were framed through personal ex-
perience, religious beliefs, superstition, or emotion. And so, claim democratic
theorists, as one is free to speak, one must also be heard. Thus, Rawls for one
emphasized the “duty of civility”: a moral imperative that for each speaker there
are listeners willing to heed and learn.14 And as such, the deliberating subject
stands as an able and willing personiªcation of the Enlightenment ideal: a Mod-
ern in the truest sense.
But are not these Moderns now living in a state of post-Enlightenment, ac-
cording to some theorists? Perhaps, but such an argument does little to dimin-
ish the theoretical centrality of the reasoning subject. Instead, it alters the rela-
tionships such subjects have with knowledge, trust and institutions.15 For
example, Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens—although their work differs on
many fronts—both argue that a particular form of modern subject typiªes post-
industrial society. Beck’s16 arguments begin with the notion of the “Risk Soci-
ety.” Here the hazards of industrialization have exceeded society’s collective ca-
pacity to control them. Thus, everyone—no matter how rich, well-connected, or
educated—is exposed to multiple “bads” such as pollution, climate change, and
food safety scares. Such conditions cause traditional modes of trusting, knowing
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and being (e.g. class belonging and trust in church and state) to break down, re-
placed by a reºexivity wherein greater freedom from collective norms gives rise
to new forms of politics and new sites of individualization and reasoning.
Some deliberative theorists suggest this new reºexivity primes subjects for
deliberative democracy, in that all can now rethink preferences and thus partake
in deliberative democratic practices.17 Yet, critics of the Risk Society thesis argue
that its “hyper-Enlightenment”18 assumptions ignore the endurance and revital-
ization of cultural practices and institutions.19 In this view, Fukuyama’s “end of
history” thesis20 now looks absurd in the face of militant religious groups and a
profound loss of conªdence that humanity can and will address the challenges
of climate change.21 Thus, “it is possible we are on the cusp of a new era, one
that puts some key and assumed features of modernity into reverse.”22
But are there not still places and peoples that remain relatively untouched
by all of the above: the Nonmoderns or Ancients, in Latour’s words? Some argue
so, but that these places are not excluded from deliberative democratic practices.
For example, Gupte and Barlett use the case study of Mendha-Lekha in the East-
ern Maharashtra state of India to show how poor and illiterate communities can
govern themselves through a “village deliberative democracy.” Here, the village
council is attended by the vast majority of local subsistence farmers, who spend
one afternoon every week in deliberation over key community issues, in what is
described as a transparent and consensus-oriented manner.
While Mendha-Lekha does meet some of the prerequisites described
above, such as cultural homogeneity and relative economic equality, many oth-
ers are absent, including literacy, wealth, and the “norms of modernity.” Thus,
Gupte and Bartlett contend, this example of deliberative democracy functioning
where many theoretical prerequisites are absent shows that “deliberation could
work well in traditional, nonmodern communities in developing countries.”23
Outside the conªnes of deliberative democratic theory, that nonmodern
contexts can be egalitarian and deliberative is of little surprise, especially to an-
thropologists and development practitioners who have detailed the diversities,
successes and failures of human small-scale self-organization.24 The point here,
therefore, is not to contest Gupte’s and Bartlett’s claims per se. Rather, it is to ar-
gue that their case study has more profound implications for deliberative demo-
cratic theories and empirical case studies than they suggest. That is, case studies
such as Mendha-Lekha imply that effective deliberation does not rely on the
presence and qualities of the Modern. Indeed, as this article claims, it can thus
be argued that deliberative environmental democracy can dispense with the
Modern and the long shadow s/he has cast over deliberative empiricism with-
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out losing sight of the import of deliberative democracy’s purpose and aims.
How then to conceptualize deliberation and the deliberator if both the catego-
ries of the Modern and the Nonmodern are to be relinquished? To explore this
question, the next two sections of this article draw on empirical research into
environmental deliberation in northern New Mexico, USA to argue that all de-
liberating subjects display qualities and capacities of both the Modern and the
Nonmodern, and that the presence of the latter is vital to, rather than the distor-
tion or failure of, effective deliberation.
Modernity, Forestry, and Deliberation in Northern New Mexico
In October 2006, two deliberative processes were held in Taos, northern New
Mexico. This article draws on observations and qualitative analysis of these pro-
cesses.25 These processes consisted of two three-day workshops that were part of
a larger Forest Ecological Restoration Analysis (ForestERA) project. The ªrst
workshop was attended by 20–30 stakeholders (the numbers ºuctuated over the
three-day process). Participants came from state and local land management
agencies, nongovernmental organizations, academia and local government. The
second workshop followed on immediately afterwards and consisted of 11 lay
participants (ªve female, six male) from within the study area who had re-
sponded to recruitment calls in the local media and were selected to attend with
a view to achieving a reasonably representative occupational and geographical
spread of participants from across the region.
The ForestERA project’s overall aims were to collect and collate primary
and secondary “best available data” on current ecological conditions in key
study sites in the Southwest USA and to use this data as the foundations of pub-
lic debate about future forest restoration options in this region. The study site in
north-central New Mexico covered an area of six million acres and includes eco-
systems of desert scrub and spruce-ªr forests at elevations from 5000 to 13,000
feet.26 Data on conditions such as tree stand densities in this area were collected
by the ForestERA team and subsequently translated using Geographic Informa-
tion System (GIS) software into spatial representations of current and possible
future forest conditions. This data then served as a key stimulus to debate in the
workshops, helping to shape and direct deliberators’ attention towards discus-
sions about priorities for forest restoration.
There are a number of reasons why such deliberative workshops were con-
sidered by the ForestERA team as a pertinent methodology to address forest res-
toration in northern New Mexico.27 For one, the project team broadly conceived
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of the project under the auspices of a “new public ecology.”28 This is a mode of
working that acknowledges the need for public input into ongoing science-
policy dialogues, as without the inclusion of diverse bodies of knowledge and
greater public ownership of decisions, policies are more likely to fail. These con-
cerns were particularly acute in this region, given the contentious history of for-
estry management and use in northern New Mexico to date.
New Mexico is the one of the poorest states in the US, with the northern-
central counties (which encompass Taos and the ForestERA study site) being the
poorest part of the state.29 This marginalization is unevenly distributed among
different ethnicities and economic classes today and reaches back centuries.
Northern New Mexico from 1500 onwards witnessed the seizure of Native
America Pueblo lands and peoples by incoming Spaniards. Over the next 150
years, these Hispanic settlers lost much of this land to Anglo settlers. The Treaty
of Guadalupe Hidalgo, negotiated between the United States and Mexico in
1848 as the latter took control of the region, secured on paper Hispanic land
rights but was for the most part not honored in practice. Such economic and
cultural marginalization has been further compounded by local “zero cut” for-
estry policies, which have prevented the removal of forestry products and small-
scale sustainable logging in the region—a mainstay of livelihood practices for
centuries.30
It is not far-fetched to argue that northern New Mexico does not meet
the prerequisites of modernity as set out in deliberative democracy theory.
Compared to the rest of the United States, it has relatively low levels of wealth,
socioeconomic equality and literacy, as well as high cultural heterogeneity.
While it does have institutional fragmentation and pluralism, at least in terms of
forest management and land ownership, the dizzying array of agencies involved
have proven to be counter-productive in the long term, prompting cultural and
institutional clashes of policy and practice that have impacted directly on in-
habitants’ livelihoods. Yet, northern New Mexico does not ªt neatly into the cat-
egory of the Nonmodern, either. Inhabitants have access to many of the trap-
pings of modernity such as representative democratic processes and advanced
technology, as well as public education and local and national income-generat-
ing opportunities. Therefore, places like Taos appear to occupy a middle
ground, a hybridization of modern and nonmodern societal conditions—a
state of affairs which in turn begs the question as to the place of the modern de-
liberating subject in the Taos workshops.
To address this question, the remainder of this article focuses on how par-
ticipants engaged in debate and the subsequent outcomes of deliberation. The
aim is to argue that effective deliberation revolved around modes of communi-
cation that supposedly belong squarely to the sites and capacities of the
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nonmodern subject. Here culture, tradition and emotion were brought to the
forefront of workshops debates, underscoring how speciªc identities and modes
of communication deemed to belong to that of the Ancient within deliberative
theory (i.e. in contrast to Enlightenment ideals) did not prevent participants
from adopting and partaking in the procedures of deliberative democratic pro-
cesses.
Displacing the “Rhetorical Fulcrum” of ForestERA
A key requirement for full and informed participation in the ForestERA work-
shops was that all were able and willing to engage with the ecological data pre-
sented through the GIS technology. To do this, participants had to follow a par-
ticular line of scientiªc reasoning—one which the deliberative democratic
theoretical prerequisites of education and literacy would facilitate, and thus one
which requires the ªgure of the Modern to be present and engaged. In the Taos
workshops, the project teams’ scientiªc data were used to stimulate participants’
debates about which aspects of forestry management should take priority over
others and why. Thus, the ability to understand and converse in the science of
environmental management was a key to participants’ contributions because, as
Lee and Roth31 claim, “scientiªc competence” is “the most important rhetorical
fulcrum around which natural resource decisions are made or by which they are
justiªed.”
Critics of the “deliberative turn” argue that such reliance on particular
modes of knowledge and reasoning stymie inclusive debate, excluding those
not schooled in distinct vocabularies and norms. For this always to be true, it
would mean that other discourses and knowledges would have been thoroughly
silenced or overridden during not only the Taos workshops, but also all other
deliberative processes. That is, those not well-versed in the methodologies and
technologies of ForestERA—Latour’s “Ancients”—would be marginalized and
overridden by the vanquishing Moderns.
On one hand, there is some evidence of this. Here the specter of Iris
Marion Young’s deliberator par excellence appears32—a being who (far from co-
incidentally) closely mirrors the capabilities and worldviews of deliberative the-
orists, which allegedly sets up conditions “under which deliberation is domi-
nated by well-educated white males well versed in the niceties of rational
argument.”33 Indeed, in the ForestERA workshops it was the Anglo male partici-
pants who overtly claimed to be schooled in, and therefore comfortable with,
the logic and vocabularies of the ForestERA approach. They were the partici-
pants who took to the workshop methodology quickest and with greatest gusto,
evidenced by both the number and the conªdence of interjections. These partic-
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ipants were most likely to draw on ªgures and arguments from scientiªc litera-
ture to support their claims. Through these contributions, they led the initial de-
bate in workshops along paths of their own choosing.
What then of the other participants and modes of relating to the
ForestERA data, which work in different ways from the logic of scientiªc liter-
acy? As the workshops progressed, talk of science and GIS was noticeably de-
centered as the “rhetorical fulcrum.” And this is a pivotal point in this article’s
argument. One line of analysis could suggest that debate thus lapsed from rea-
son and rationality (modern) to non-rationality (nonmodern), and therefore
moved away from authentic deliberation. However, taking up lines of argument
from critics of deliberative democratic theory, I want to suggest instead that a
hybridity of experience, tradition and scientiªc knowledge came to the fore.
Here, the cultural narratives of Native American and Hispanic injustices and his-
torical longevity were central, producing deªnite effects on the trajectory and
outcomes of the workshops. In short, the ªgure and norms of neither the Mod-
ern nor the Nonmodern captures in full the debates and identities that predom-
inated in Taos. That is, the fact that we (including the northern New Mexico
deliberators) have never been modern does not automatically mean that, by the
process of elimination, we are nonmodern.
One of the key debates within the workshops focused on the designation
and management of wilderness areas—in particular, whether the extraction of
forest products and grazing of cattle should be allowed on such land in the re-
gion. The prevailing “no-cut” forestry policies have resulted in rising tree stand
densities and, many argue, the demise of local livelihood practices, as well as
rising likelihood of catastrophic ªre events, themes echoed by workshop partici-
pants. For example, Sarah (an Anglo female in her mid-40s) repeatedly stated
that the only way to execute realistic and valid ecological restoration was to take
“everyone and everything”—buildings, inhabitants, vehicles and workers—off
the land. This argument mirrors the pro-preservation and anti-development aes-
thetic of regional and national (predominantly Anglo) environmental groups,
which collectively argue that humans be evacuated from all “green” spaces34 (a
position backed up by long-standing scientiªc forest management research and
practice).
Yet, the responses of workshop participants displaced this discourse,
drawn as it was from an amalgamation of forestry science and Anglo environ-
mental politics. This move was exempliªed by Luis, a Hispanic lifelong resident
of the region who countered Sarah’s claims with what he called “cowboy com-
mon sense science.” This discourse drew on place-based and historically embed-
ded ideas of who knew about, belonged to, and thus was able to speak about
the land, a position that pertained for the most part to Hispanic and Native
American participants. For example, workshop participants drew on stories
from centuries past to qualify their opinions about how livelihood access to the
forests did and could sustain ecosystem and community health. This included
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stories about how the broad spacing of trees in the forest once allowed horse-
drawn carriages to drive straight through, thanks to selective and sustainable
felling practices that produced healthy and productive ecosystems where “the
grass was up to horses’ bellies.” Other participants recalled times when it was
possible to drink straight from local streams: a feat no longer feasible as the
“over-stocked” lands have caused local water to take on a “brown tint.”
Another (Anglo) participant backed Luis up. Drawing on speciªc ªgures
he had gleaned from conservation biology literature, he claimed that 222 trees
per acre was an ideal stand density, in stark contrast to the 2000 trees per acre at
which some local forests currently stand. These ªgures were legitimized by
ForestERA team members, who stated that 222 trees per acre was reasonable,
based on “historical range of variation (HRV) data for tree stands.” Luis’ claims
were further reinforced by other participants’ personal experiences of the eco-
logical beneªts of small regular ªres.
This line of dialogue continued throughout and saw the formation of co-
alitions around assertions such as Luis’, which drew together personal and
shared cultural experiences and scientiªc data and methodologies. These coali-
tions, however, were not of pure form. That is, they were characterized not by
science (the Modern) meeting local experience (the Nonmodern) and ªnding
commonalities, nor by local knowledge gaining legitimacy through its align-
ment with the “cognitive authority” of ForestERA. Rather, it was the speciªc
articulation of different ways of knowing within this deliberative space that
generated a local authority and “a space in which to assert attachment to, and
make claims on, a particular place through knowledge and use of natural re-
sources.”35
Indeed, as research into the social and environmental politics of this re-
gion has argued, it is not possible to separate the scientiªc discourses of tree
stands and conservation biology from the cultural history of land use and own-
ership. Instead, “the environmental and racial discourses in the region are mu-
tually constituted.”36 Does this mean that reasoned debate is not possible in this
context? Deliberative democrats argue that reasoned debate requires “reºection
and the possibility that minds can be changed.”37 This outcome appears un-
likely in settings such as the Taos workshops where “one’s position is tied to
one’s identify.”38 Yet, in the Taos workshops debate centered on stories of iden-
tity, ethnicity and belonging which did not preclude the existence of open and
reasoned deliberation. Indeed, the discussion within the Taos workshops
achieved some shared vision and ownership of potential ways forward for re-
gional forest restoration, while drawing heavily on narratives of identity, emo-
tion, and history. The aims of the workshops were to produce a set of collec-
tively agreed upon restoration priorities mapped onto speciªc sites within the
study area. The ªrst workshop fulªlled these aims. The second workshop got
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part way there, running out of time due to the extensive debate taking place—
debate that did reach some shared sense of what was valued in the region and
why.
For example, participants such as Luis were not well-versed in the language
and worldview of conservation biology and GIS. Yet others recognized and re-
sponded to the cultural histories and authority of those participants’ belonging
to the region. For example, Sarah’s claims that forest restoration should equate
with pristine wilderness was based on her having recently spent four days track-
ing deer, when she witnessed ªrst-hand the damage done by clearing and inten-
sive land management. In response, Luis contended he had spent 65 years run-
ning cattle in the exact same place. Thus, he knew the land and understood that
land more than she ever could. His claim drew claps and murmurs of support
from around the room, thus underscoring the effect of seemingly “unauthentic”
deliberation on participants.
So if We Have Never Been Modern, What Now?
The preceding discussion of northern New Mexico is a modest attempt to open
further debate on how the modern/nonmodern binary so central to deliberative
democratic theory precludes the observation that “The Enlightenment rational
subject is not the only possibility for political subjectivity, but a historically-
constructed convention that is laden with exclusions.”39 What then is to be done
about other political subjectivities, the panoply of human experience and iden-
tities currently excluded from the deliberative turn, in theory and often in prac-
tice? One could claim subjectivities such as Luis’ reanimate the nonmodern
subject. As such, the goal is to mold such individuals and collectivities into rea-
soned modern beings—a project that, arguably, many deliberative democrats fa-
vor. Or, one can broaden the subjectivities with which the deliberative turn en-
gages. This latter option is favored by some critical social thinkers who have
scrutinized the multiple modes of interactions in which deliberators trade,
claiming that “Deliberation is not only a normative ideal but also a messy, so-
cially embedded encounter in which a complex series of judgments are con-
stantly negotiated around the knowledges, legitimacy and identities of all indi-
viduals involved.”40 The question then becomes how to frame theoretically and
analyze these “messy encounters:” these “different identities and the different
kinds of communication that accompany them.”41 One solution is to “allow in”
modes of engagement and communication other than “rational-speak,” such as
humor and irony. Such assertions pertain as much to what is said, as to how
ideas are communicated. For example, Jürgen Habermas has recently reworked
earlier arguments, questioning the boundaries of what is considered “within
reason.” For example, he has made the case that faith-based arguments should
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be allowed into the liberal democratic public sphere, as we “cannot know
whether secular society would not otherwise cut itself off from key resources for
the creation of meaning and identity.”42 Thus, some deliberative democracy the-
orists have paid attention to identity-based modes of communication in deliber-
ation—but, arguably, more as an add-on to the framework of authenticity and
modernity than as a critique of it in entirety.
What happens to the ªgure of the Modern in this context? If all (or at least
a diverse number of) forms of communication, knowledge and identity are to
be let in, does this not take the deliberative turn down an atheoretical path; one
that disallows coherent evaluation of process and outcomes and descends into a
relativist normative and empirical free-for-all? Not necessarily, and to explain
why, debates within social and political research about grounding theory in
quotidian knowledge and practices are of use.43 Here, claims are made that “in
trying to understand the ethical and political constitution of people, it is more
important to attend to how they behave than how they think they should be-
have (or, especially, how theorists argue they should think and then behave).”44
This line of argument suggests an emphasis on “practice theory”45—that is,
“watching what happens, listening to what is said, asking questions”46 as a
means to access how individuals make sense of and “go on” in the everyday.
Thus, the deliberative turn could do just that: observe deliberation in situ,
across diverse contexts and issues, side-lining the imperative to pre-determine
who, where and what counts as authentic deliberation.
One potential problem with this line of analysis is that it suggests relent-
less empiricism wherein case study after case study charts differences and diver-
sities but ªnds little in the way of common ground. While there is merit in such
a concern, a fundamental rethink of the place of the modern subject in delibera-
tion does not automatically suggest this outcome. Here, the work of social theo-
rists such as Bruno Latour and his claims that “We have never been modern”47
are once again pertinent. As already outlined, Latour (and others) argue that the
ªgure of the modern subject is a historically constituted ideal, not the descrip-
tion of a deªnite entity or reality. He makes such claims through detailed
ethnographic work on the production of scientiªc knowledge, which leads him
to argue that the supposedly universal and value-free knowledge of the modern
subject does not come into existence separate from the contingencies of time,
place and personality. Serendipity, preferences, beliefs and power struggles all
play their part, in both their most mundane and profound manifestations.
How then has the Modern taken centre-stage in the West’s understanding of
itself and, indeed, in the philosophical foundations of deliberative democ-
racy? Latour’s answer is the formation of what he calls the “Modern Constitu-
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tion,”48 a social order that arose in 17th century Europe through public debate
about the distribution of power between science and politics, and which re-
sulted in the separation of the human world (politics) and the natural world
(science) into still-existent domains of thought and practice. Yet, as Latour ar-
gues, in reality, how we come to know and act in the world cannot be separated
out so neatly into distinct domains. Thus, the modern world has never hap-
pened, in the sense that it has never functioned according to the rules of its
ofªcial Constitution alone.”49 While there is not space here to dwell on the spe-
ciªcs, Latour’s work underscores one way in which the modern subject can and
has been displaced as indispensible to deliberative environmental democracy.
Such a move is more than just an exercise in intellectual pontiªcation. It has a
thoroughly political and applied impetus, as it eschews the narrative of the su-
perior capacities of the Modern and looks to dismantle “the Great Divide, the
great narrative of the West, set radically apart from all cultures.”50 This is not to
argue away differences between peoples or, at the other extreme, to valorize dif-
ference as a good in and of itself. Rather, the aim here is to question how theo-
retically and empirically to treat and analyze such differences if the reiªcation of
abstract cultural forms and subjects is no longer taken as given—that is, if the
Modern and the Nonmodern are no longer unproblematic nouns.
One perspective is to frame deliberative environmental democracy as the
subject of ethnographic research. What might deliberative democracy as an
ethnographic endeavor that fully embraces practice theory look like? To address
this question, this article returns ªnally and in brief to the case study of
Mendha-Lekha. Gupte and Bartlett state that this isolated and nonmodern com-
munity is not distinctive in its region of India in terms of its economic and so-
cial make-up. However, it is unusual in its self-rule ethos, which is attributed to
its roots in the Gond system of tribal governance. This hints at a line of investi-
gation that eschews holding up an isolated case study as emblematic of a
nonmodern state of being. Rather, one pertinent question is how Mendha-
Lekha came to be the way it is, and how it remains so. This requires paying par-
ticular attention to the historical and contemporary relations Mendha-Lekha is
embedded within, as polities, villages and institutions—whether rural or
urban—are the outcome of speciªc historical and contemporary conditions,
further intensiªed by the fact that seemingly “remote” or “non-capitalist” rural
spaces are no longer so due to “greater intensities of globalization processes and
of global interconnections in some rural localities.”51 Indeed, to return brieºy to
the northern New Mexico example, focusing only on what was happening “in
the room” may very well give rise to the argument that debate was not authentic
or deliberative, as it drew on deeply held identity politics that belonged to only
a few participants. However, placing these debates within what is happening
and has happened “outside the room” leads to a greater understanding of how
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collective regional identities (of both Anglos and non-Anglos) have been
formed through the narratives and experiences of injustice and loss that became
so central to the ForestERA workshops.52 In short, the debates within these
workshops “make sense” within their speciªc context. Indeed, deliberation in
Taos devoid of the central discourses of identity, race and belonging would have
failed to address in any meaningful way the key issues at stake for the regions’
residents.
Thus, given the above, is there any rationale for the continuation of the de-
liberative turn, if not to achieve authentic deliberation as understood within
prevailing theory? As other social scientists have claimed, the possibility is now
open for exploring and working towards deliberative environmental democra-
cies without reliance upon the “Modern Constitution.” Thus:
This reªgures the aims of deliberative process, seeing them less as routes to
consensus and more as processes through which actors may be able to im-
merse themselves in the worlds of others. Deliberation can be recast as part
of the wider cooperative processes through which modernist political insti-
tutions may be open to confrontations by the potentially nondualist forms
of reasoning.53
The outcomes of such an immersion in the worlds of others; how deliberation
can confront these “modernist political institutions”; and what “nondualist
forms of reasoning” look like are points for further debate and exploration,
which, as this article has argued, together have the potential to confront a prob-
lematic schism between theory and practice within the deliberative turn.
Concluding Remarks
This article was stimulated by, and is in part a response to, Gupte and Bartlett’s
call for deliberative democratic theorists to engage with contexts and institu-
tions outside the West. The aim has been to further their claims that incidents of
deliberative democracy in Nonmodern contexts present a “signiªcant chal-
lenge” to received deliberative theory. However, contrary to Gupte and Bartlett,
this article has argued that the signiªcance of this challenge pertains not only to
the fact that forms of deliberative democratic governance exist outside of the
West, and thus need to be brought into the deliberative fold, questioning the
pertinence of deliberative democrats’ theoretical preconditions along the way.
Such cases of deliberation in action in rural India highlight the highly problem-
atic nature of the categories of Modern and Nonmodern that Gupte and Bartlett
still hold as central to their analysis. In short, through the discussion of the dy-
namics of deliberative workshops in northern New Mexico, along with the work
of theorists such as Latour, the concept of the modern subject as a universal and
noncontentious category—an untroublesome noun as well as adjective—has
been argued as requiring further conceptual and empirical scrutiny.
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This argument does not signal a retreat from the normative and political
aims of the deliberative turn. Although there are claims to the contrary, analysts
critical of deliberative democracy theory take the persistence of inequality and
the creation of more egalitarian forms of political practice as their starting
point. The methods to challenge these inequalities include scrutinizing received
discourses, a tradition upon which this article has drawn.54 Thus, language
seemingly naturalized, universal and voided of its historical genesis—such as
the Modern and the Nonmodern—becomes open to question through empiri-
cal exploration and genealogical discourse methodologies, as developed
through the work of Michel Foucault.55
On an applied level, the purpose of this approach is to bring previously
excluded sites of deliberation and modes of communication into conversation
with deliberative democratic conceptual debates, to attempt to bridge an appar-
ent schism between the theory and realpolitik of deliberation. For example, en-
gaging and building upon the cultural narratives and diverse identities ex-
pressed in the northern New Mexico workshops—rather than dismissing them
as Nonmodern or closed to alteration—offered the Taos participants the oppor-
tunity to engage and open for discussion the discourses of injustice and loss that
have shaped society “outside the room.” As it turned out, the desired environ-
mental outcomes (selective logging) were brought into alignment with desired
social outcomes (sustainable livelihoods), suggesting that within speciªc con-
texts such engagements can lead to both positive ecological and societal deci-
sions, not a trade-off between them or a shutting down of deliberative engage-
ment.
Thus, reframing the deliberative turn as an ethnographic project opens up
the possibilities of experimentation in the forms and sites of deliberation. This
fact sits comfortably with Pragmatist-inspired theorists who argue that democ-
racy is ªrst and foremost a form of social inquiry, not the end in itself that must
have pre-determined conditions before it can proceed.56 But for some delibera-
tive democratic theorists and practitioners such assertions may be hard to swal-
low given an emphasis to date on meeting very speciªc internal conditions
within deliberative spaces, as well as external societal preconditions. However,
for those who can see the potential that deliberative democracy as an ethno-
graphic project contains, the work has just begun, to establish an inclusive and
empirically grounded base on which to take these arguments forward.
References
Atencio, Ernest. 2004. La Vida Floresta: Ecology, Justice, and Community-Based Forestry in
Northern New Mexico. Santa Fe, NM: Sierra Club.
78 • On the Modern and the Nonmodern in Deliberative Environmental Democracy
54. See for example Butler 1997; and Nelson 1999.
55. For example, see Foucault 2004.
56. See Bohman 2004.
Baber, Walter F., and Robert V. Bartlett. 2005. Deliberative Environmental Politics: Democ-
racy and Ecological Rationality. London: MIT Press.
Beck, Ulrich. 1992. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage Publications.
Beck, Ulrich, Anthony Giddens, and Scott Lash, eds. 1994. Reºexive Modernization: Poli-
tics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Bohman, James. 1996. Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy. Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press.
———. 2004. Realizing Deliberative Democracy as a Mode of Inquiry: Pragmatism, So-
cial Facts and Normative Theory. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 18 (1): 23–43.
Bourdieu, Pierre. 2001. Masculine Domination. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Butler, Judith. 1997. Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative. New York and London:
Routledge.
Cornwall, Andrea, and Vera Schatten Coelho. 2007. Spaces for Change? The Politics of Citi-
zen Participation in New Democratic Arenas. London: Zed Books.
Davies, Gail. 2006. The Sacred and the Profane: Biotechnology, Rationality, and Public
Debate. Environment and Planning A 38 (3): 423–443.
Davies, Gail, and Jacquelin Burgess. 2004. Challenging the “View from Nowhere:” Citi-
zen Reºections on Specialist Expertise in a Deliberative Process. Health and Place
10 (4): 349–361.
Dryzek, John. 2000. Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations. Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press.
———. 2001. Legitimacy and Economy in Deliberative Democracy. Political Theory
29 (5): 651–669.
———. 2005. Deliberative Democracy in Divided Societies: Alternatives to Agonism and
Analgesia. Political Theory 33 (2): 218–242.
Duncan, J. S., and N. G. Duncan 2001. The Aestheticization of the Politics of Landscape
Preservation. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 91 (2): 387–409.
Enstad, Nan. 1998. Fashioning Political Identities. American Quarterly 50 (4): 745–782.
Ferguson, Kennan. 2004. I ♥ my Dog. Political Theory 32 (3): 373–395.
Foucault, M. 2004. Society must be Defended. London: Penguin.
Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press.
———. 2006. After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads. London: Proªle Books.
Gupte, Manjusha, and Robert V. Bartlett. 2007. Necessary Preconditions for Deliberative
Environmental Democracy? Challenging the Modernity Basis of Current Theory.
Global Environmental Politics 7 (3): 94–106.
Habermas, Jürgen. 2006. Religion in the Public Sphere. European Journal of Philosophy
14 (1): 1–25.
Hammersley, Martyn, and Paul Atkinson. 1995. Ethnography: Principles in Practice. Lon-
don: Routledge.
Kohn, Margaret. 2000. Language, Power, and Persuasion: Towards a Critique of Delibera-
tive Democracy. Constellations 7 (3): 408–429.
Kosek, Jake 2004. Deep Roots and Long Shadows: The Cultural Politics of Memory and
Longing in Northern New Mexico. Environment and Planning D 22 (3): 329–354.
Latour, Bruno. 1993. We Have Never Been Modern. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
———. 2004. Politics of Nature: How to Bring Science into Democracy. Cambridge, MA: Har-
vard University Press.
Lee, Stuart, and Wolff-Michael Roth 2006. Community-level Controversy over a Natural
Kersty Hobson • 79
Resource: Toward a More Democratic Science in Society. Society and Natural Re-
sources 19 (5): 429–445.
Nelson, Lise. 1999. Bodies (and Spaces) Do Matter: The Limits of Performativity. Gender,
Place and Culture 6 (4): 331–353.
Niemeyer, Simon. 2004. Deliberation in the Wilderness: Displacing Symbolic Politics.
Environmental Politics 13 (2): 347–372.
Rankin, Katharine. N. 2003. Anthropologies and Geographies of Globalization. Progress
in Human Geography 27 (6): 708–734.
Rodriguez, S. 2001. Tourism, Whiteness and the Vanishing Anglo: Seeing and Being Seen.
In Tourism in the American West, edited by D. M. Wrobel and P. T. Long, 194–222.
Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press.
Rundle, Guy. 2007. It’s Too Easy to Say “God Is Dead.” In The Best Australian Essays of
2007, edited by Drusilla Modjeska, 129–138. Melbourne, VIC: Black Inc.
Said, Edward. 1978. Orientalism. London: Routledge.
Sen, Amartya. 2005. The Argumentative Indian: Writings on Indian History, Culture and Iden-
tity. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Sisk, Thomas, D., John W. Prather, Haydee M. Hampton, Ethan N. Aumack, Yaguang Xu,
and Brett G. Dickson 2006 Participatory Landscape Analysis to Guide Restoration
of Ponderosa Pine Ecosystems in the American Southwest. Landscape and Urban
Planning 78 (4): 300–310.
Sisk, Thomas, D., Melissa Savage, Donald A. Falk, Craig D. Allen, Esteban Muldavin, and
Patrick McCarthy 2005. A Landscape Perspective for Forest Restoration. Journal of
Forestry 103 (6): 319–320.
Smith, Graham 2003. Deliberative Democracy and the Environment. London: Routledge.
Stirling, Andrew. 2006. Analysis, Participation and Power; Justiªcation and Closure in
Participatory Multi-Criteria Analysis. Land Use Policy 23 (1): 95–107.
Szerszynski, Bronislaw, Scott Lash, and Brian Wynne. 1996. Introduction: Ecology, Real-
ism and the Social Sciences. In Risk, Environment and Modernity: Towards a New
Ecology, edited by Scott Lash, Bronislaw Szerszynski and Brian Wynne, 1–26. Lon-
don: Sage.
Tewdwr-Jones, Mark, and Philip Allmendinger 1998. Deconstructing Communicative
Rationality: A Critique of Habermasian Collaborative Planning. Environment and
Planning A 30 (11): 1975–1989.
Waage, Sissel A. 2001. (Re)claiming Space and Place through Collaborative Planning in
Rural Oregon. Political Geography 20 (7): 839–857.
Williams, David, ed. 1999. The Enlightenment: Cambridge Readings in the History of Political
Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wilmsen, C. 2007. Maintaining the Environmental-Racial Order in Northern New Mex-
ico. Environment and Planning D 25 (2): 236–257.
Woods, Michael. 2007. Engaging the Global Countryside: Globalization, Hybridity and
the Reconstitution of Rural Place. Progress in Human Geography 31 (4): 485–507.
Wynne, Brian. 1996. May the Sheep Safely Graze? A Reºexive View of the Expert-Lay
Knowledge Divide. In Risk, Environment and Modernity: Towards a New Ecology, ed-
ited by Scott Lash, Bronislaw Szerszynski and Brian Wynne, 44–83. London: Sage.
Young, Iris Marion. 2000. Inclusion and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
80 • On the Modern and the Nonmodern in Deliberative Environmental Democracy
